Leo R. Casey v. Nelson Brothers Construction Company : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1969 
Leo R. Casey v. Nelson Brothers Construction Company : Brief of 
Respondent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.John W. Lowe; Attorney for Respondent 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, Casey v. Nelson Brothers Construction, No. 11721 (1969). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4832 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk





: I .. 
'I 






" iii I I · \: 
\1 '. , ' 
'\ f ; ·( . j 
11\ \,.. I , \I/ 
' . I 
' I 
I . ii. 
''1 • I I jl 
1 '\ ,\, .. : 
. :·" . '1, ·J,: 
" • J • 
' ()f th-e I , " ' I ' ,'. ,,, " ' 
I 
STATE,OF UTAH. ( 
\ . \'\ j )-'"t '/ .. ··, . ,:_ 1·1>1 '·.· 
.,·111·11·m·, ·" ,; 1:'1· ' II .L.L , > ' f' 'bJ , ' "' . 1.f . r.· 
\. \ ' I - >. I 1 ' 
' I . I,'\ ;, ' ... 
1'" .• I ) 
11:.I I . '1j : 
/• ( ,I-:' if·,' I 
. •1 '' ·\ ,t I • ,,·, 
I " . •. I , .... l 1> , 
' .. ' ' ', \ . I t • .... I . ,.i \' -, ' BRIEF OF BESPbND:mcT 0\' l (. . • . I ,, '- i').il 
• ' • > --., - '1 . ' \ • ' .... • ' - •• ' ',· .. {' .. • i' 
' ... ' ·,_ 
( ' .., I , , • ·, A .. •• ·"' '\ ' > I 
• • • ' " • ' ' , • ' " l ·I ..... • ',· ' . 
' t I. i '\•,' _.,.1,..,, 
I ·t.' , ' '\1 ., ' ' : I ' -.. I . , ,. I , ',_ ' .. ',.. C', 
1:., frem ·* 
1, , . .a.or a.a.11· .. ,.: . , L ,.. ,, ,. • -.. - • 
· · "onorable K, Snow, · . ·. ' · ' " , . 
\,... ., ... J 
''. . . ·I , Iii r\ Ii.,•, 
'' ,. L 
If• ''o i' \' 
I )\ • " ; \ I ' ' ' ',j \ 
, ·11 ', 
1 
' \ , I j 
; ) 4 t) . ' I 'I.' ,. ' 
, - I ' , f I ·- ·• 
' . JOHN·W LOWE \ .. I\ . t 
'" . f I 
·I tt• . • 1 .( •I ·\' · , · I I : E · .. . .. , ' ,i: ... g_; · ' ,· · · vait Lake ,':, · .-
, f J()'J 2 4 1969 Attof'ftelJ8 for f1ll4 · ·." ·; 1, Besinn_ ndettt · " · -'· '. . · , ", .... 
I ' "' I ---------..... . ' / 
_'-·.1•..:. ;upremo C- _,•'.). lJt4i;-
1'' ' ! . . . I 1-· 
.·,·BEED B. RECH.ARDS 
\ 
'· 5oo Kennecott Building 
Sali- Lake City. Utah ,,
· ·' Attorney f ()r Def end,.am,t and, 
· Appellant- • , 
\ . l· ._ 
' ( 1 · j' 
'· 
Page 
DISPISITION IN LOWER COURT - ___ --------------------------------------· 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL .. ----·--·-------------·········· 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------- -----··- - --- ----------·-----·-···------····· 1 
ARGUMENT --------·---------------------------------------------···-------·······--·-·-······· 5 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR 
FAILURE TO USE THE MOTOR GRADER. ---····-·-··---···-· 5 
POINT IL 
DAMAGES ARE NOT EXCESSIVE..--·----·--·--·-----····------·· 9 
POINT III. 
DEFFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED. ···----·--····-----···--·---··-··----·········-··--··-··-10 
POINT IV. 
THE MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS WAS PROP-
ERLY RULED UPON. ·--·--·-··----·--·-·--··-···-······-·-··--·-··--·-······ 12 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF AS CROSS APPELLANT SHOULD RE-
COVER AN ADDITIONAL $1256. ···---·-···-··----·--··-·-·····-------12 
SUMMARY -····--·---··-·----···-·---···--------------------------------------···-----------------13 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
17A, CJS, Contracts, Par. 389 ________ ---------·-·---------------------·-----··--- 8 
2 Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Par. 410, Par. b________ 8 
IN THE SUPREME CO·URT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LI<JO H. CASEY, 
Plaintiff and Re:spvndeut, 
vs. 
Nl<JL80N CONSTRUC-
TION COI\f P ANY, 
Defendant and Appell(JfJ1t, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
11721 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In awarding the plaintiff judgment, the lower court 
allowt>d the defendant an offset of $1256 for gasoline 
used by plaintiff in the performance of a subcontract 
despite an accord and satisfaction (R. 53). 
RELIEF SOlTGHrr ON CROSS APPEAL 
Plaintiff' by its cross appeal seeks au increa8e in 
its judgment inereasing the amount awarded by the sum 
of $1256 on the grounds that then' was a settlement, 
eomprornisP, satisfaction and release of defendant's claim 
in that amount (P. 4). 
rl,IH· stat<->rnent of fads ('ontained in appellant's brief 
i i Hal'<'ll rnfo largdy in that it omit::-; facts upon which 
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the findings of fad madl' by tlH· lo\n•r eourt were based. 
']1he facts ean be titated as follows: 
In August 19GG the parties au instrument 
consisting of two agreements, one being a lease of a 
grader, and tlw other heing a for construc-
tion work (Ex. P.l). 
Under the grader lease and a later modification 
thereof $3513.25 acerued to plaintiff for the time it was 
used. Offsets totaling $1788.78 ,,-ere allowt•d to which 
neither party is objecting hen•in. The grader lease pro-
vided that it would be used by defendant until a project 
for the Bureau of Indian Affairs was completed. De-
fendant failed and refused to use it after December 21, 
1966, and ordered plaintiff to remove the grader from 
the job site (R. 90, 119, 120, 129, 14G, 155). The agrePd 
rental to be paid vvas $9.50 per hour. 1-'he project on 
December 21, 1966 was no more than one-third com-
pleted, insofar as motor grader work was concerned, 
and had said grader been used until the completion of 
the project, it would have bt>en used at least an additional 
697 hours (R. 93, 122). Plaintiff 1vould have incurred 
Pxpenses of 50¢ per hour had said machine been used 
the additional 697 hourn. Plaintiff was damaged by de-
fendant's failure and refusal to m;e said motor grader 
in the sum of ( R. 53). 
Under the subcontract agreement, plaintiff per-
formed eertain work, but on Oetolwr 24, 196G the parties 
t·nh>n•tl into an aeeord and satisfadion tPnuinatin(J' tlw b 
subcontract (R. 54 Par. 8). Despite the aecord and satis-
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fadio11 (Ex. P. ±), tht> court allO\\'ed defendant to offset, 
against vlaintiff's dairn on the grader lease, the value 
of rnadP availahlt> d<>fendant to plaintiff in 
the iwrformance of sub('ontract in the amount of 
$125G (R. 53). 
8pt>eific rnisstah'rnents or implications in defendant's 
statement of fads are Jwreinaftt>r eounnented upon. 
It is statl'<l (•um plaints \n·re hy government 
inspectors about work done hy plaintiff's father, Casey, 
;)r., as operator of the motor grader and that some of 
the \\Tork had to be done over. Other work had to be done 
over also. This is to be expeeted on construction jobs 
(R. 155), hut particularly \\'as this not unusual on this 
job, heeausp the inspt>ctors were "going by the book" 
and requiring the "impossible" ( R. 128-9). It is true 
that th<> motor grader operator was to perform his duties 
to comply with dEc'fendant's superintendent's require-
nwnh;. 11he su1wrintendent was \Vardle (R. 114), and 
in Wardle's 01>inion CasPv 8r.'s \\'Ork was sastifactorv. ' . ' 
(R. 117, 123, 128, 129). 
It is stated that Orin N Plson, Viee Pn•sident of the 
ddendant, orrlt>red the tt•rmination of Casey, Sr.'s em-
ployment. This was over tlw protPst of the superin-
tPndPnt (R. 120). rrJiis Ol'dPr, and dPfPndant's ordering 
plaintiff to rPmove his gradPr WPrP for tlw selfish pur-
posP of using a diff Pr<>nt grader, wJ10sP bankrupt owner 
was indd>t<'d to dPfrndant, tla•rdiy lit1uidating an uncol-
h·<'ta!Jl(• aernu11t (H. 119, 120, 1:29, l-1G, 153). 
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When the superinh·rnlt•nt ohjeefrd. oll the 
that such bnsint>ss prartiC'P was mwthieal, Nelson's n•ply 
was he "had nevt>r had hoHor or ethics, t>ither onP, llllt 
a slice of bread on hi::; table." ( H. 122) r:L'his was one of 
many agreement::; on tlw 1-lnuh·r's Point job that W<'l'f' 
"all being thrown to one by .Mr. N"elson" (R. 128). 
It is stated that Sr.'s 8ervites were termin-
ated on November 18, 19GG. Casey, Sr. te8tified that he 
was then only laid off temporarily \d1ik' all work was 
shut down (R. 108, 193). 
It is stated that plaintiff c·amP and took the motor 
grader to an unannounced and undisclosed destination. 
The court found (R. 54) that thi8 was rnerely in compli-
ance with the order of the defendant to "get this grader 
the hell off the job" (R. 90, 119, 120). 
It is stated that plaintiff had a deal pending \vith 
a third party for the use of the grader on another job. 
The pros1)ective deal was for the use of <>quipment other 
than the grader (R. 91). 
It is stated that Ca8ey, Sr. 8aid, "\Ve're going to 
get it off the job before the Indian team it up." This 
was Athol Stone'8 testimony, a witne8s for the defend-
ant (R. 187). Casey, Sr.'8 version of the incident was 
as follows: "Now, tlwn 1 said to him, '\Vhat's that In-
dian doing on that patrol?' and I '\Yell, why ain't 
I on it'?' and he said, 'Well, you don't need to worry 
ahout that joh, that patrol.' I I<• said, '['m laying it off 
anyway. I'm boing to U8e 11 r. Stmw's bPeau8e lw 
oweb 11w so!lH' and l'rn trying to g(-'t a littl1· caught up 
oil it, a lit ti<' of that ( H. HJ5). 
11 is stah·d that th<' l<wation of thP motor grader, 
after n•Hwval, was not disdos<•d. 'J1h<·rP is no evidence 
that defendant, after ord<·ring the n·moval of the grader, 
<•Yer <'hanw·d its position that tlw grader would not be 
used on tlw joh, and tlwr<'for<· thPrt• <'an hP no inference 
that knowing or uot knowing of thP loeation of the grader 
111ade any difference. 
lt is statPd that e<·rtain tonnag<·s of rnaterial were 
tt:·wd lwfore and after defendant ordered the grader 
n·1110n•d. 'rhe irnpli<'ation is that the eourt's finding 
of' fact that the job was one-third emnplt'ted (R. 53) is 
in error. Other witnessPs tPstifiPd that tlw joh was only 
orw-fiftli <·owplekd (R. 9:), F'nrthermorP, tonnage 
used is not the C'ritl'rion of work J"(-'lllaining. The 
grader \\·as to be nsed not to spread gravel, but 
abo for mixing, shoulder \rnrk and ditch work (R. 122). 
ARGlTMEN'r 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR 
FAIL URE TO USE THE MOTOR GRADER. 
D<>fendant argues that tlwrP was authority to ter-
ll1inat<-• Sr.'s Plllploynu•nt and that he was termin-
ated. 'l'Jip i111plieation is not statt•d, hut \re as::mme that 
tl1<' impli<'ation is that this so11whow justifies the breach 
of ('<rntrad to thP gradt>r for t}H• Pntire job. 
CasPy, Sr. \ras th<' l'l1tplo:1•<'<' of th(• dPfPndant. His 
11 ork \\"tls satisfadory to tl1I' supt-rintPndent, but tla• 
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vice president of the defendant orden'd the superintend-
ent to terminate him. Although tlw word apparently 
didn't get down to Casey, Sr. himself, ,,-]Jo says he had 
been only temporarily laid off, eyen assuming he 
fired, and that the firing was because of poor operation, 
which is also not supported by the Casey, Sr., 
was the defendant\; employee and h>- its own voluntary 
act of firing its employee defendant <'an't justify 
breach of contract to use the grader. 
Defendant argues that it didn't know wlwther it 
had permission to continue to use the grader after tlw 
alleged firing of Casey, Sr., and assumabl>- justifies ih 
failure to use the grader because of its uncertainty as 
to whether it could be opE)rated with another operator. 
The evidence is that plaintiff didn't care 1vho operated 
it as long as defendant 1vas safo.;fiP<l ( R. and that 
it was the defendant who had wanted Casey, Sr., as an 
operator (R. 116). But, more importantly, according to 
defendant's own testimony, after defendant had fired 
Casey, Sr., and without any a1Jproval from plaintiff, 
defendant continued to use the gradPr with another oper-
ator (R. 178). It hardly, therefore, is believable that 
the grader was not used through tlw completion of the 
job because of uncertainty as to the right to do so with-
out a particular driver. defendant's own 
superintendent testified that his vice presidPnt in charge, 
Orin Nelson, told him to Sr., and get rid 
of plaintiff's grader so that the claim the defrndant had 
against the assistant superinternknt'8 bankrupt company 
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(·ould IH' \rnrked out by rn.;ing its grader (H. 119, 120, 
U9, 1-±G, 155). 
Ddendant argues that tht' evidPm:e \\a::.; eonflicting 
a:-; to or not ddendant had ordered plaintiff to 
take tltP motor gradt•r off the job. Conflicting evidence 
\\as r<'solved in palintiff 's favor h:· the lower court 
(H. ;J-±), and ha::.;ed thereon this <.'.ourt urnst affirm. 
Defendant arguPs that m·gotiations by plaintiff with 
n third party for contract work could "have triggered 
the desire in plaintiff to remove the motor grader." 
'l1lw testimony was that plaintiff had no intent to use 
the gradPr on any otlwr job until after defendant had 
]>reached the contract ( H. 107). There were negotia-
tions for or the nse of other equipment and there thus was 
a possibility of using this grader also on that job after 
defrndant told plaintiff to get the grader off its job 
(R 90). In fact, that job didn't materialize be-
<'anse tlw third party did not be<.'.orne the low bidder 
(R. 91). Yt't, defPndant asks this court to reverse the 
lower court because of a speculative possibility, when 
the lrnn·r C'ourt had positiv<' t>vidence lwfore it and made 
a finding thet•ron in opposition to defendant's conten-
tions. 
DPfondant argue::-; that plaintiff abandoned the con-
trnet wh<'n, upon being told by defendant, "you can get 
thi:-; gradPr tlw ht-'ll off the joh,'' he did ::-;o. 
'Vt> (•orn·Pd(• as a rnattPr of law tlwre can he an 
aliarnlonrnent of a eon tract: 
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"However mutual abandonment, cancellation 
. ' ' or rescission must be clearly expressed, and acfa 
and conduct of the parties to be sufficient must 
be positive, unequivocal, and in('onsistent with the 
existence of the contract." 17 A, C.18, Contracts, 
Par. 389. 
''Where there has been a material breach of 
a bilateral contract, the injured party may ordin-
arily treat his own duty as discharged and en-
force a right of action against the ·wrongdoer. 
Unless there is repudiation, or circumstances make 
such a course impossible, the injured party may, 
however, if .he fit,, of aga1irst the injur)r cg-u¥eaf 
by the breach. Under the rult> of the Section a 
third course is open to the injured party - the 
entire termination of the contract. As a matter of 
logical reasoning, it will always be more profit-
able to the injured party to accept his own dis-
charge and retain a right of action against the 
wrongdoer than to assent to a termination of all 
duties arising from the contract -". 2 Restate-
ment of the Law of Contracts, Par. 410, com-
ment b. 
Defendant argues that compliance with the order to re-
move the grader somehow became a mutual rescission. 
The court found 
"The rental agreement entered into August 
1966, as amended October 24, 1966, relating to 
motor grader was not tenuinated by plain-
ti_ff nor did plaintiff breach said agreement, nor 
did he elect to discontinue said agreement. - The 
removal of the motor grader from defondant's 
job was at the di reetion and instance of defendant. 
Plaintiff did not withdraw from the motor oTader 
b 
9 
rental agTet·ment and djd not knuinat(• same. 
Defendant ordered plaintiff to take the motor 
grader off the job" (R. 53-5-1-, Pars. 7, 9, 10). 
This i:-; :-;upportPd hy thP PvidP1tet-' and this lwing an 
adion at law tht-' findings of the lowt•r <'ourt are con-
elusivt-'. 
POINT II. 
DAMAGES ARE NOT EXCESSIVE. 
lt is argued hy defendant that the "uncontroverted 
testimony of Mr. Orin Nelso11" shows that only 53.04% 
of thP job remained to be done whereas damages awarded 
"ere hmwd upon the fact that two-thirds of the job 
n•mained unfinished at the time of the breach. 
Om• fallacy is that the testimony of Orin Nelson 
\\as eontrovt•rtNl. His O\nt superintendent said that four-
fifths of the work remained to be done (R. 122). Plain-
tiff also so testified ( R. 93). 
Another fallaey is that tonnage of material used 
thereafter is not thP only erikrion of grader work to 
ht• done. ':I1he grader ,,·ork, in addition to spreading 
gravd, included mixing, shouldPr work and ditch work 
(R. 122). 
As shown by tlw findings of fad, the damages in the 
amount of $6123 computed as follows: 
''Dt>fendant failed and rPfnst•d to use said 
motor grader aft(•r D1•(•p11tlwr 1966. The 
agrPPd rPntal for tlw period aftPr Deeember 21, 
l9GG was pPr hour. rrlw projed on Decem-
h<·r l 91iG was cmt>-third <·0111plde insofar as 
1110tor grader work Wa8 concerned and had 8aid 
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grader been used until th(' c0111pk•tion the pro-
ject, it would have been USt'.J an additional ()97 
hours. Plaintiff would have rneurred Pxpemws of 
50¢ per hour had said mad1im• been Usl•d the 
additional G97 hours. Plaintiff used reasonahle 
efforts to mitigah1 his damage and used tlw grade1· 
for snow removal from which lw rPalized the 
sum of $150.00 which was the ma.."Ximmn amount 
he could have realized by the exPreise of reason-
able efforts. Plaintiff was damagt-d by def end-
ant's failure and refusal to use said motor grader 
in the smn of $G123, which sum is owed by dr-
fendant to plaintiff." 
The testimony supporting the various faetorn is found 
in the record, as follows : 
Rental of $9.50 per hour (Ex. P.5 ). 
Project only one-third complete (R. 93, 122). 
Additional future use at least G97 hours (R. 93-
96). 
Expenses of 50¢ per hour (R. 94). 
Mitigation of damages (R. 91). 
(Computation: G97 X 9 = G27:3 150 6123) 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED. 
The first ground for the motion is aceident or sur-
prise. The accident or surprise refern•d to is counsel's 
being surprised hy the eourt's ruling ( H. +3) that coun-
sel's contention, that there was an abandonment of the 
contract by the plaintiff, was not so. By rt'a<ling his 
citations, eounsel would hav<' found that, as he eih•s at 
page 11 of his hritd: "It is hPld that it is a 
L1LLestion of ultimate fad as to whl'ther a contrad ha:-
11 
]w!'ll ahaHdo1wd or mutuall.Y n·:.;<·ind<·d," and thus he 
c:liould haw lw<'ll pr<•pan·d for tlu· eourt':.; ruling on the 
facts presented. 
'(1}H' lleXt IJasi:.; for II!'\\. trial j:.; JlP\dy <li:->COVPred 
l'Yi<lt•J1<·(·. Tlw all<·g<·d nt>\dy di:-;eovc·n·d evidence relates 
to the ti11w :-;01w· other µ;rad1·r, whid1 was m;ed on the 
job, \ms op1·rated. Tlw <·x.eus1· for not having evi-
d!·Jwe at tlw tim1· of tlw trial is that tlw attorney first 
handling th<· <·as<' di<·d, and \\·!11·11 trial <·<nmse>l first took 
the eas(' Jw had flu and prn'lllll<mia, ''hut despite the 
short tiirn· to 111·epan•, it was dPeided to proceed with 
the trial at tlw regular :.;<>tting'' ( H. -+:n. The affidavit 
dop;.; not indicah• that at tlw time of trial that counsel 
"·as ill and, in faet, it sho\Y:.; that at the time of trial 
lw de1.>rned himse If and made a decision to pro-
eeNl. If eounse l was not r<>a<ly, he should lia Yl' so stated 
lwfore an unfavorable juclg111<•nt re::mlh,cl. 
rrlw third ground of tl1<· motion is that there \\'t'l'e 
Px.cessin• damagt>s, app1·aring to hav<' bPen given under 
the inflrn·1H·1· of vassion or prt>jucli<·<» Damages well in 
excess of thosP awarded an• W<'ll <l<WllllH'ntP<l, as de-
s<·rihed ahov1'. Pia inti ff':-- 1·vi<l1·rn·1· was that -!-/;) instead 
of of th<' \York was y<'t to ht> <lorn>. Xo damages were 
awanl<·d for plaintiff's los:-; of tht' <'qui pllwnt although it 
was n•possPssPcl hy the st>ll1•r hP<·an:.;1· of plaintiff's in-
to kPPp up the dtw to dl'l°t•ndant's de-
fault ( n. ). 'l1h(' hn·n<·li was i11t1•ntio11al, and although 
p11nitivl' da11iaµ;1·s \n•n· :.;ought. 110111• \\"<·n· a\\'anh•d. 
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POINT IV. 
THE MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS WAS PROP-
ERLY RULED UPON. 
It is argued by defendant that thP eourt improperly 
denied its motion to amend the findings. ·without taking 
the space to itemize each contention, it can be generally 
stated that the findings \Yhieh dt>fendant proposed wen 
inessential, or were based upon conflicting testimony on 
which the eourt ruled agaim;t the defendant, or wert' 
not supported by the Pvidence. In most instances, the 
substitution of defendant's proposed findings for those 
as actually entered would have eliminated essential find-
ings of fact. The court rejected thP proposed amend-
ments because it did not concur with defendant's con-
tentions. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF AS CROSS APPELLANT SHOULD RE-
COVER AN ADDITIONAL $1,256. 
The court reduced the amount claimed by plaintiff 
by an offset of $1256. The $1256 represented the cost 
of gasoline ordl'red by defendant for use on the job at 
Hunter's Point. The gasoline was sold by American 
Oil to defendant, not to plaintiff, and was delivered to 
Hunter's Point where defendant had its contracting job 
on which plaintiff was a subcontractor. The dates of 
the sales were September 8 and 14, 191>6 (D. 9-10). Both 
defendant as prime contractor, and plaintiff as subcon-
tractor, had trucks which used gasoline (the grader of 
plaintiff which was involved in the lease used diesel 
fuel irn;tead of ga:-;olirn') (H. :205). Although, initially, 
plaintiff furnished his own gas for his trucks, because of 
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longer haub due to s\\·itchj11g from one pit to another, 
<lefendant agn·ed to and did latPr furnjsh plaintiff his 
o·asoline (R. 200, :.m7). was sorne left in 
the tanks on Oetolwr 2-!- ( R. 201). rl1lw court found that 
v±, executed October 2-!-, <'ntitk•d Tt->nnination of Sub-
contract and Helease, related to the subcontract and not 
to the equipment lease of thP grader (I{. 54). On October 
24, by exetuting P±, IJlaiutiff and defendant mutually 
agreed that obligations relating to thP subcontract should 
be settled by the payment to plaintiff of an agreed sum 
which "·as received by him. ln making this settlement 
there was no execption made of any bill to American 
Oil Company of $1256. The effeet of letting defendant 
offset, against plaintiff's claim in relation to the grader, 
a sum which had been previously ineurred in relation 
to the subeontract work, the aecounts of which had been 
settled by mutual agreement, is to violate the terms of 
the agreement which the testimony shows, and the court 
found, settled the subcontract rights between the parties. 
By reducing plaintiff's reeovt>ry, the court has ignored 
the accord and satisfaction. 
SUMMARY 
The damages for failure to use the motor grader 
were supported by the evidt>nce. :K elson's contention 
St>ems to he that, having breached the eoutract by order-
ing the grader to he removed, ]w nt>ed pay no damages 
because he didn't have tlw opportunity to change his 
mind. gven if the law \\'<'r<' srn·h that h<> was entitled to 
insist that plantiff the grader available in the event 
• 
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of a change of heart, ther(' is no Pvid<·m·e that lw would ,, 
have used the machine furtlwr. 
The damages awarded, far from exce::;sivP, are 
much less than the evidence would have supported. 
The parties having already ::;ettled their accounts 
on the subcontract, defendant is not t>ntitled to the offset 
which the court awarded of $125() and tht> judgment 
should be increased by that amount. 
BRAYTON, L<J\Vg & HURLEY 
JOHN \V. LO\V E 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
1001 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
